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█ Abstract The state-of-the-art in studies on mentalization suggests that capacity to understand other 
minds (mindreading), self introspection and consciousness, mental time travel in the past and the present, 
linguistic communication, are different components of a hierarchical organization of several functions 
reflecting the evolutionary development of the specie and integrates increasingly complex, mutually coor-
dinated brain levels. The understanding of the precise hierarchical relations between them, that reflect 
the phylo- and ontogenetic evolutionary pathway for adaptation to the complex interpersonal and socio-
cultural environment, has an essential application in psychopathology and psychotherapy, in particular 
for those clinical conditions where the normal integration of high order mental functions is hampered by 
developmental relational trauma. 




█ Riassunto L’importanza della comprensione delle relazioni gerarchiche tra le funzioni di ordine superiore 
nella pratica clinica – Lo stato dell’arte nell’ambito degli studi sulla mentalizzazione suggerisce che la ca-
pacità di comprendere le menti altrui (mindreading), l’introspezione e la coscienza di sé, la capacità di 
spostarsi temporalmente nel passato e nel presente, la comunicazione linguistica, sono componenti diver-
se di una organizzazione gerarchica di molte funzioni che riflettono lo sviluppo evolutivo della specie e 
che integra livelli cerebrali reciprocamente coordinati e di complessità crescente. La comprensione delle 
precise relazioni gerarchiche tra essi, che riflettono il percorso evolutivo filo- e ontogenetico verso 
l’adattamento al complesso ambiente interpersonal e socio-culturale, possiede un importante risvolto ap-
plicativo nel campo della psicopatologia e della psicoterapia, in particolare per quelle condizioni cliniche 
dove l’integrazione normale delle funzioni mentali di ordine superiore viene ostacolata da un trauma rela-
zionale di carattere evolutivo. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Hughlings Jackson; Trauma evolutivo; Trauma da attaccamento; Mentalizzazione; Psico-
terapie centrate sul corpo. 
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The magistrate burst out laughing  
«Italian, I was somewhat weak in Italian…»  
«Italian is not the issue: reasoning is»,  
said the professor 
Leonardo Sciascia, A simple story 
 
ERICA COSENTINO AND FRANCESCO FER-
RETTI opposed a position they define as “lin-
guistic idealism” which claims that the sense 
of self, reflexive thinking and, in general, me-
ta-representational skills are a product of 
language, and hold the opposite point of 
view. There seem to be basically three argu-
ments to oppose linguistic idealism. 
The first is that representational and me-
ta-representational skills seem functionally 
independent from language and seem to exist, 
albeit in a primitive form, even in subjects 
without full-fledged linguistic skills, such as 
some anthropomorphic monkeys. The se-
cond argument is that meta-representation 
and mindreading skills are constituents of 
language, not the other way round. The third 
argument, conforming to recent neuroscien-
tific research findings, is related to language 
as the apparent product of a complex func-
tional network, consisting of evolutionary 
older mental functions, such as the ability to 
orient in time between past episodic memo-
ries and representations of the future, as re-
quired by orienting in a forest, in addition to 
mindreading. 
 
█  Mindreading and language: Which came 
first? 
 
With reference to the first and second ar-
gument, Cosentino and Ferretti overturn lin-
guistic idealism and claim that «meta-repre-
sentation is one of the constituents of lan-
guage development» not the other way 
around.1 The Authors present several expe-
rimental findings, collected in studies on an-
thropomorphic monkeys’ behavior, to sup-
port their claim: 
 
Language as we know it, developed as an 
adaptation within species already in-
volved in inferential communication, and 
therefore already mastering mindreading 
skills to a significant level. In other words, 
from a relevance theory standpoint, the 
existence of mindreading in our ancestors 
is a precondition for the origin of lan-
guage to arise.2  
 
Cosentino and Ferretti also support the 
«primacy of thought over language […] be-
cause language structure reflects the way of 
thinking» (therefore in agreement with Scia-
scia’s words). Furthermore, going back to 
studying human beings, they claim that the 
ability to grasp the counterpart’s intentions is 
a clear prerequisite to, not a product of, lan-
guage understanding, also citing evidence for 
the difference between what we want to 
communicate and the actual communication. 
An example of Cosentino and Ferretti’s 
claim can be found in the telephone conver-
sation between a woman in danger (A) and 
the emergency services operator (B) recently 
quoted by several US newspapers:  
 
B: 911, where is your emergency? 
A: 123 Main St. 
B: Ok, what’s going on there? 
A: I’d like to order a pizza for delivery 
B: Madam, you’ve reached 911 
A: Yeah, I know. Can I have a large with 
half pepperoni, half mushroom and pep-
pers? 
B: Hmmm…. Im sorry; you know you’ve 
called 911, right? 
A: Yeah, do you know how long it will be? 
B: Ok, Madam, is everything ok over 
there? Do you have an emergency? 
A: Yes, I do 
B: ...And you can’t talk about it because 
there’s someone in the room with you? 
A: Yes, that’s correct. Do you know how 
long it will be? 
B: I have an officer about a mile from 
your location. Are there any weapons in 
your house? 
A: Nope 
B: Can you stay on the phone with me? 
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A: Nope. See you soon, thanks 
 
This is an example of the usefulness of so-
cial skills, both in terms of the motivation to 
help a fellow human being and specific so-
cial-cognitive skills. The operator’s success in 
going beyond «the surface of the other per-
son’s behaviors to identify the mental states 
which originated them»,3 in this case, the 
ability to understand the hidden meaning of 
the woman’s telephone request and recognize 
her cry for help, is due to the ability to as-
cribe specific purposes to others, a skill many 
consider starts developing around one year of 
age and in any case before the development 
of linguistic skills. Obviously, the woman’s 
safety and survival (which are the primary 
goals of evolutionary pressures determining 
the development of increasingly complex 
mental skills) were not due to understanding 
merely the linguistic text, but to understand-
ing the discrepancy between the text and the 
context.  
Furthermore, if understanding the real in-
tention of others seems more adaptive than 
grasping the messages contained in the sym-
bolic abstractions of verbal language, at least 
when someone is in danger, it is not surpris-
ing that mindreading skills may be a consti-
tuent of language, and they may also arise 
evolutionarily earlier. 
The importance of defining hierarchical 
relationships between mental functions, as 
postulated by Cosentino and Ferretti with 
reference to mindreading and language logi-
cal-symbolic abstraction skills, has an essen-
tial application in psychopathology and psy-
chotherapy. We shall come back to this issue 
in the second part of this article. 
 
█  Language as a result of a mental func-
tions network 
 
The second issue highlighted by Cosentino 
and Ferretti is that mindreading skills are not 
«sufficient to exhaustively account for lan-
guage pragmatic analysis».4 On the contrary, 
they claim and document that language 
seems to arise from a complex neurocogni-
tive network consisting of higher complex 
functions such as mindreading, and the abil-
ity to orient in episodic memory or project in 
the future, and that these skills are based on, 
and use, archaic functions related to evolu-
tionary older levels such as space orientation:  
 
Accumulating data suggest that envision-
ing the future (prospection), remember-
ing the past, conceiving the viewpoint of 
others (theory of mind) and possibly 
some forms of navigation reflect the 
workings of the same core brain network. 
These abilities emerge at a similar age and 
share a common functional anatomy that 
includes frontal and medial temporal sys-
tems that are traditionally associated with 
planning, episodic memory and default 
(passive) cognitive states. We speculate 
that these abilities, most often studied as 
distinct, rely on a common set of process-
es by which past experiences are used 
adaptively to imagine perspectives and 
events beyond those that emerge from the 
immediate environment. 5 
 
In these hypotheses on language, it is im-
portant to note the analogy with other men-
tal functions which seem to bring skills de-
veloped for adaptation to evolutionarily old-
er contexts (the physical environment) to a 
higher level (e.g., adaptation to social and in-
terpersonal contexts).  
For instance, considering that adaptations 
for spatial travelling seem to also be used for 
Mental Time Travelling, or to integrate syn-
tactic-logic components in language, it was 
demonstrated that the neurobiological bases 
for alarm in instances of physical pain also 
contribute to alerts in instances of social 
pain.6  
The hypotheses suggested by Cosentino 
and Ferretti for language, analogies for which 
are found in other complex mental functions, 
imply an important principle: higher mental 
functions are based on the integration of 
other evolutionarily older functions. 
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█  The example of empathy 
 
An example of the need to include human 
higher complex mental functions and their 
neurobiological correlates in a hierarchic-
evolutionary framework may originate from 
the neuroscience of empathy. 
Sometimes we inappropriately generalize 
when we claim that mirror neurons and, in 
general, certain mental functions mirroring 
skills typically associated with the social 
brain constitute the neurobiological founda-
tions of empathy. Actually we can plausibly 
claim that, in order to reach the mental func-
tion we call empathy, we need to integrate 
functions originating from several evolutio-
narily different neurocognitive levels.7  
The first level is that of mirror neurons, 
i.e., the ability of some nerve sublayers to 
perceive purposes and mental states by acti-
vating in our body some sensorimotor and 
emotional schemes similar to those we see 
activated in other people. This perception-
action coupling is supported by the activa-
tion of the so-called mirror neurons, and al-
lows for some sort of somatic apperception 
of the other person’s experience, showing in 
manifestations such as facial expression mir-
roring,8 perception of other people’s pain9 or 
emotional resonance (demonstrated in emo-
tions such as revulsion or regret).10  
This is a necessary though not sufficient 
primary constituent of empathy, expressed 
by Trevarthen’s concept of intersubjective 
sympathy.11 These mechanisms probably 
play an essential role in “emotional conta-
gion”,12 i.e., the automatic activation of other 
people’s emotional states in us, creating sha-
red representations between us and them.13 
However, in order to experience an au-
thentic empathic experience, we need to be 
able to differentiate ourselves from others; 
therefore, the affect sharing typical of empa-
thy is modulated and controlled by the per-
ception «of whose feelings belong to whom».14 
As a further confirmation of the existence of 
this second “social” level and of its modulat-
ing ability, Tania Singer and colleagues 
found in 2006 that the intensity of the affect 
resonance with other people’s pain changes 
with the quality of the social relationship 
with them.15 According to their experiments, 
the empathy affective component increases in 
direct correlation with the level of cooperation 
experienced by subjects, therefore, the pain of 
those who were more collaborative is more 
acutely felt than that of agonistic opponents. 
Therefore, if a social representation of the 
self and the other allows for adaptive modu-
lation of emotional contagion, this is not 
configured yet as empathy, defined as the 
ability to comprehend and appropriately re-
spond to someone else’s affective experience 
and to his consequent needs.16 In order to ob-
tain such a sophisticated response, we must 
assume the involvement of complex mental 
functions such as reflexive thinking, mind-
reading, Mental Time Travel in the episodic 
memory of our personal experience (how did 
I feel when I experienced this?), the prefigu-
ration of a solution and, maybe, language, 
i.e., the inseparable functions, in an ethologi-
cal-evolutionary framework, from the rela-
tionship between the subject and the symbo-
lic-cultural world shared by virtue of the sub-
ject’s affiliation, to emotional contagion, 
shared representations and differentiation 
between the self and others.17  
Consistent with this hypothesis, function-
al neuroimaging studies indicate that the ac-
tivation intensity of the brain areas govern-
ing the production of linguistic activity and 
abstract thinking in the observing subject is 
in direct proportion to the shared linguistic, 
social and cultural elements perceived in the 
observed subject, therefore, the intensity of 
emotional contagion is the neurophysiologi-
cal correlate of the intensity of the feelings of 
social-cultural affiliation of the subject. On 
the other hand, the conscious representation 
of the emotional state implies its modulation 
by the prefrontal cortex areas and directs be-
haviors to prosocial purposes.  
Furthermore, as demonstrated by Liber-
man and colleagues in their neuroimaging 
studies,18 one of the main factors inhibiting 
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automatic activation, necessary to reduce 
emotional contagion and fostering empathic 
skills is affect labeling, i.e., the verbal identi-
fication of emotions.  
As postulated by Decety and Jackson, 
empathy 
 
involves parallel and distributed pro-
cessing in a number of dissociable compu-
tational mechanisms. Shared neural rep-
resentations, self-awareness, mental flexi-
bility, and emotion regulation constitute 
the basic macrocomponents of empathy, 
which are underpinned by specific neural 
systems.19 
 
█  Hierarchical integration of mental func-
tions: Neojacksonism 
 
Considering what Cosentino and Ferretti 
postulated concerning the relationship be-
tween mentalization, language and spatial 
exploration, together with the aforemen-
tioned results from social neuroscience stud-
ies on pain and empathy, some common ele-
ments seemingly outlining some general 
principles of mental functioning, emerge. 
The first, almost taken for granted by 
many scholars,20 is that the evolutionary 
pathway outlined by Darwin seems directed to 
adapt to an increasingly complex social envi-
ronment with the complexity of the central 
nervous system (CNS) as its morphological 
correlate, in other words the more deve-loped 
a species, the more complex its CNS. This im-
plies the existence of several brain organiza-
tion levels performing different functions, ex-
pressing different motivations and organizing 
through increasingly complex cognitive char-
acteristics: from homeostasis to thirst to the 
more refined social and cultural motivations.21 
From this perspective, the more a species 
has developed, the more complex its relation-
ship with the social environment will be: 
from the relationship with caregivers, com-
mon to all mammals, to the construction of 
social rank dynamics, to the formation of 
peer alliances and forms of cooperation, all 
the way to the creation of a relationship with 
the social group, its rules and the cultural 
products of extended societies, which seem 
to require language.22 Only at the end of this 
evolutionary and developmental pathway, 
can one relate with him/herself and his/her 
own mind.23 Increasingly complex mental 
functions developed to adapt the person to 
an increasingly complex social environment, 
constituting a counterpoint relationship be-
tween social brain and social environment. 
The second feature, which seems to arise 
from the previous observations, is that a 
function developed by a species to adapt to a 
specific environment can be marshaled, at an 
evolutionary more modern level, for other 
purposes. This is the case of the functions 
developed for orientation in the physical en-
vironment, marshaled at different levels for 
time orientation in episodic memory and 
language syntax, or the marshaling of the 
neural structures governing the processing of 
physical pain to signal danger in affective and 
social connections (this may help us to un-
derstand why linguistic metaphors describing 
these breakages often refer to bodily injuries: 
“when you treat me badly, you hurt me”, 
“you are breaking my heart”). 
This second feature implies that, in order 
to ensure proper functioning of the evolu-
tionarily modern mental ability, all morpho-
functional levels must be highly integrated 
and follow their developmental hierarchical 
balance. Furthermore, this explains why lo-
wer mental functions are neurologically lo-
calized, stable and have low flexibility, 
 
wherein higher levels are characterized 
by elaborated networks with progressive-
ly greater flexibility and functional so-
phistication. Rather than replacing lower 
mechanisms, however, higher systems 
critically depend on these lower sub-
strates for informational inputs and for 
achieving motor outputs in a hierar-
chical-like fashion.24 
 
Effectively over the last decade many re-
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searchers have demonstrated the role of 
widely distributed cortical networks in un-
derpinning higher-order integrative mental 
functions. These networks are conceived as 
dynamic states of the cerebral cortex, charac-
terized by a high degree of functional con-
nectivity between widely distributed neurons 
and they are considered to play a crucial role 
in high level cognitive functions: working 
memory, top-down executive functions, at-
tentive tasks and consciousness. 
Such a model of mind functioning leads to 
some theoretical implications important for 
psychopathology and clinical work: the im-
portance and vulnerability of integrative 
skills relying on higher mental functions. As 
we shall discuss in the next paragraph, these 
implications are even more important in 
terms of orienting clinicians to such patholo-
gies where we assume the core pathogenic 
mechanism operates in a dis-integrative way, 
as is the case of developmental trauma.25 
Clinically, a pioneering evolutionary-
hierarchical theory of brain structure and or-
ganization was formulated at the end of the 
XIX century by the famous British neurolo-
gist Hughlings Jackson, who stated over a 
century ago: «We have multitudes of facts, 
but we require, as they accumulate, organiza-
tions of them into higher knowledge; we re-
quire generalizations and working hypothe-
ses». Jackson’s work has had a significant in-
fluence on the most recent concepts of nor-
mal and pathological mental functioning26 as 
well as on the psychopathological theories at 
the beginning of the 20th century proposed by 
Pierre Janet and Sigmund Freud, and also on 
more modern psychoanalytic theorizations 
by Henri Ey, Allan Schore and Russel 
Meares. 
The essential core of Jackson’s work is 
that the mind, rooted in the body’s natural 
world, consists of a hierarchical organization 
of several functions reflecting the evolutio-
nary development of the species and inte-
grates increasingly complex, mutually coor-
dinated levels. Each level modulates and is 
coordinated with the lower levels, building 
their representations and, «at the highest 
levels, the mind represents itself integrating 
the activity of its lower level components».27 
The modernity of Jackson’s concept of the 
mind is also confirmed by its evolutionary 
and relational nature. The French psycho-
analyst Henri Ey highlighted that  
 
Jackson was able to imagine and present a 
hierarchized structured model of the cen-
tral nervous system which is not so much 
the model of the spine architecture, but 
rather a model of the autonomy of rela-
tional life ontogenesis.28 
 
This naturalistic and relational position 
partly anticipates the theories of modern 
psychology and psychiatry and is clearly re-
flected in Attachment Theory, and its con-
tribution to the understanding of the inter-
subjective nature of mental dis-integration 
based on the concept of disorganized attach-
ment and developmental trauma also de-
scribed by Attili in this special issue. 
According to Jackson only at the end of the 
evolutionary path does the mind represent its 
self. Through its self-representation, the mind 
produces consciousness, expressed at its “high-
est levels” (in Jackson’s words), through works 
and functions such as William James’s Self and 
Janet’s personal synthesis, i.e., the ability to in-
terpret in a unified and consistent way, the 
parts of one’s own body and the memories of 
the self.29 As stated before and consistent with 
the relational/inter-subjective nature of this 
perspective, it is only at the end of this evolu-
tionary and developmental pathway, that one 
can relate with him/herself and his/her own 
mind30 and contrive to grasp his introspective 
self-description as rationalized in terms of au-
tobiography.31 
This seems to be consistent with Mar-
raffa’s claim that mentalizing other minds 
has a functional and evolutionary priority 
over introspection. Marraffa suggests that 
introspection and self identity consciousness 
is the arrival of this evolutionary pathway 
and emerges through  
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the act of turning on oneself the capacity 
to mindread other people; and that this 
occurs through that socio-communicative 
interaction with caregivers (and succes-
sively other social partners) investigated 
by attachment theory.32 
 
█  Psychopathology of dis-integration 
 
A neo-Jacksonian mental operating model 
of the type found in Cosentino and Ferretti’s 
and Marraffa’s theses is currently the theo-
retical reference framework to understand 
the psychopathological and clinical aspects of 
relational/attachment trauma disorders, i.e., 
the effects of repeated traumatic relational 
experiences, as is typically the case in deve-
lopmental trauma. To this end Russel Meares 
recently stated that:  
 
the effect of complex trauma is the di-
sintegration, disintegration of the highest 
levels of the mind, which means of the 
self… the primary task of psychotherapy 
for patients with trauma-related disorders 
is to deal with a fragmented and disinte-
grated sense of self […] the self can be con-
ceived according to the definitions of 
Jackson as reflective, or “higher-order”, 
consciousness […] Based on Jackson’s 
theories, the hypothesis proposes an etio-
logy of disturbances as the failed matura-
tion of cortical networks leading to a dis-
ruption in coordination, or integration, of 
sites of brain activity.33 
 
Actually a growing amount of clinical and 
neuroscientific evidence demonstrates that 
childhood adversities such as abuse and ne-
glect are the main risk factor for mental 
health problems34 and negatively affect inte-
grative mental functions either by hampering 
the development of the hardwired brain net-
works on which they are based or by hinder-
ing their dynamic operation.35  
This dis-integrative psychopathological 
mechanism stems directly from the concept 
of désagrégation (disaggregation) introduced 
by Pierre Janet at the turn of the past century 
to indicate a disorder of the integrative ca-
pacity leading to mental fragmentation over 
several levels: from a deficit in the field of 
consciousness to an impairment of the very 
unity of the subject’s personality36. Contrary 
to the defensive hypothesis postulated by 
Freud, according to Janet, dissociation im-
plied a disconnection of the normally over-
lapping and integrated functional levels of 
mental functions due to a structural collapse 
induced by the violent emotions caused by 
relational traumatic experiences.37 Over the 
last twenty years, Janet’s theories, after being 
buried by Freudian psychoanalysis,38 have 
recovered their status, especially in the psy-
choanalytic world, as the most important ba-
ses for understanding psychological trauma 
and dissociation. 
According to the theories originating 
from Jackson, these failures in optimal de-
velopment could lead to mental dis-
integration that consists in the loss of inte-
gration between hierarchical levels. The con-
sequences of this dis-integration have two 
main manifestations: on the one hand, the 
absence of integrative function leading to 
typical dissociative symptoms such as deper-
sonalization, or more subtle experiences of 
loss in the sense of self-unity (e.g., the painful 
incoherence of borderline patients), on the 
other, the uncontrolled surfacing of the pre-
viously integrated lower functions such as in-
voluntary surfacing of a traumatic memory 
or sudden loss of affect control.39 Indeed 
many contemporary researchers and clini-
cians have demonstrated the effects of dis-
integrative processes on other high integra-
tive mental functions, typically altered in de-
velopmental trauma patients, such as affect 
regulation, metacognitive monitoring, men-
talization and the capacity for coherent au-
tobiographic narratives.40 
Traumatic memories provide us with an 
example of dis-integrative psychopathology. 
Since they were experienced and recorded 
when the overwhelming emotional experi-
ence of the trauma altered integration capa-
  Farina 
 
332 
city, this prevents them from being remem-
bered in their multimodal integrity and often 
results in their being remembered in an un-
integrated way.  
It is difficult to place them in the past, 
and the Mental Time Travel skills are lost; 
sometimes they cannot even be verbalized, 
but are remembered as physical and emo-
tional memory states, deprived of the inner 
sensation of something being recalled. The 
price of being able to automatically activate 
defensive responses to traumas is the loss of 
the ability to witness the experience as a 
whole, therefore, our worst human experi-
ences hamper or prevent our mind from its 
task of preparing us to make sense and as-
cribe a meaning to what happened.41 More-
over, negative interactions with caregivers 
hamper the development of metacognitive 
functions (either the mindreading of other 
minds or introspection) leading to more se-
vere difficulties in regulating emotions in so-
cial exchanges and building a coherent sense 
of self and personal meaning.42 
 
█  The influence of dis-integrative psycho-
pathology on psychotherapy 
 
The theoretical model of traumatic dis-
integrative psychopathology, based on the 
neo-Jacksonian concepts of the mind, has 
important repercussions on the treatment 
theory level. 
The most common psychotherapies, both 
psychodynamic and cognitive, assume the 
functioning of integrative mental capacity to 
treat emotional disorders: this is why their 
process is called top-down, since it seems to 
marshal the most sophisticated mental func-
tions to influence lower emotional levels of 
the mind from the top. Just think for exam-
ple about the level of integrative capacity 
needed to benefit from a psychoanalytical 
interpretation, or the Mental Time Travel 
skills necessary to explore the autobiograph-
ical memories during ABC in a cognitive-
behavioral therapy session, or simply during 
an affect labelling task. However, as men-
tioned earlier, trauma-related disorders in-
volve a (trait-dependent and state-dependent) 
reduction of this higher integrative capacity. 
This is one reason why classical top-down 
therapeutic approaches are considered insuf-
ficient for dis-integrative psychopathology.  
Albasi reminds us that, from a clinical 
standpoint, classical psychoanalysis is aimed 
at making the implicit relational experience 
explicit (verbalized), especially through 
transference interpretation. Dissociative pro-
cesses in traumatic attachment make this op-
eration impossible for the subject.43 With re-
spect to this, Bessel van der Kolk said that, 
basically, «words cannot integrate the sensa-
tions and disorganized motor patterns con-
stituting the trauma core imprint» and the 
therapy must integrate the sensations and ac-
tions left uncompleted, for people to acquire 
a sense of familiarity and effectiveness in 
their organism.44 
This is why the therapy for dis-integrative 
psychopathology developed using a combina-
tion of top-down and bottom-up therapies, 
i.e., techniques and therapeutic methods act-
ing on the hierarchically lower and evolu-
tionarily older mental functions, which are 
generally left intact, in order to reintegrate 
the newest and more sophisticated ones. For 
instance, body-oriented therapies work on 
sensorimotor patterns (for instance, spatial 
orientation in the therapy office) to reorga-
nize Mental Time Travel between the trau-
ma-disintegrated autobiographic memories 
or use body sensations to restore a sufficient 
level of integration of the experience of the 
self and the outside world in the client. In 
this perspective, the therapeutic relationship 
as a concrete corrective emotional experience 
is preferred to the verbalization of transfe-
rence interpretations.45 
Furthermore, logical dialogue may be as-
sociated with analogical dialogue, highlight-
ing non-verbal intuitive communication, 
such as preverbal exchanges between mother 
and child in the first months and years of life 
where the core of communication is the af-
fective and intentional tuning that usually 
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leads to the development of mentalizing ca-
pacities,46 such as those that enabled the 911 
operator to understand the danger of the 
woman who called to order a pizza, but that 
is compromised in the severe forms of emo-
tional neglect belonging to developmental 
trauma. 
 
█  Conclusion 
 
Dis-integrative psychopathology therapy 
proceeds in the original direction of the evo-
lutionary and developmental pathway. This 
is the only way to progressively recover the 
client’s integrated and coherent sense of self, 
mindreading and introspection, Mental Time 
Travel for episodic memory, and to symbolize 
in words the typically speechless traumatic 
experience and ascribe new meanings to it. 
This, in my opinion, shows the applica-
tion value of Cosentino and Ferretti’s and 
Marraffa’s concepts in clinical practice and 
the importance of studying and understand-
ing hierarchical relationships between mental 
functions. 
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